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University of North Carolina at Greensboro
There are several sound reasons to suppose that earnings volatil-
ity plays a role in program participation behavior; however, the results 
from previous empirical studies have been equivocal. To the extent that 
researchers have considered volatility, they have mostly focused on dif-
ferent types and defi nitions of this concept, such as short-term versus 
long-term shocks in earnings or the overall variability of earnings histo-
ries. Researchers have not considered how associations might develop 
for some groups but not for others. In this paper, we examine how the 
effects of earnings variability on program participation are likely to 
differ, depending on a household’s position in the income distribution. 
Specifi cally, we posit that there will be asymmetries in these effects 
depending on whether the household is initially above or below an eli-
gibility threshold. 
There are many reasons why asymmetric effects might appear, 
including a simple “mechanical” explanation. Consider a household 
whose long-term trend earnings place it within the eligibility guide-
lines of the Food Stamp Program or some other assistance program. If 
earnings and other characteristics are completely stable so that there 
is no short-term variability, the household will remain eligible for the 
program over time and may participate, depending on how it values the 
program’s benefi ts relative to its costs of enrollment and compliance 
(Moffi tt 1983, 2003). If we instead allow for some earnings variability, 
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there is a chance that the household will lose eligibility from time to 
time, leading to a decrease in its opportunities and incentives to par-
ticipate. Thus, among initially eligible households, there is a mechani-
cal association in which greater variability reduces participation. These 
associations are reversed, however, when we consider households that 
are initially above the eligibility threshold. For these households, stable 
incomes lead to continuous periods of ineligibility and nonparticipa-
tion, while unstable incomes lead to temporary periods of eligibility 
and perhaps participation. We subsequently discuss additional concep-
tual reasons for the association between earnings volatility and program 
participation, but as this simple explanation shows, asymmetries in ef-
fects should be considered.
We examine the relationship between earnings volatility and food 
stamp participation using survey data from the Three-City Study that 
have been linked to administrative case records on program partici-
pation. The Three-City Study is a longitudinal survey of low-income 
families who were living in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio. A dis-
tinct advantage of the Three-City Study for our purposes is that while 
it is a low-income sample and includes many food stamp recipients, 
it was not initially limited to program participants. Thus, the survey 
includes participating and nonparticipating households as well as eli-
gible and near-eligible households. At each wave, the survey gathered 
information about people’s work and earnings histories. These features 
facilitate our analyses of program participation, earnings volatility, and 
asymmetric effects.
Another advantage of the Three-City Study is that its survey re-
sponses have recently been linked to administrative data. Previous 
household-level research on participation in food assistance programs 
has usually relied on one or the other of these two types of data. Our 
approach of using combined survey and administrative data addresses 
some of the weaknesses of using only one or the other of these two 
sources. From the administrative data, we obtain more accurate and 
lengthy descriptions of participation histories than we could through 
surveys, overcoming the recall problems inherent in retrospective ques-
tionnaires. At the same time, the survey data help us to surmount some 
of the shortcomings of administrative data. Program records only de-
scribe behavior after people have applied to or joined a program and 
can only be used in limited ways to examine people’s participation de-
up08djivafch3.indd   36 10/8/2008   10:02:33 AM
Variable Effects of Earnings Volatility on Food Stamp Participation   37
cisions, especially their program entry decisions. Administrative data 
also typically lack important explanatory variables and covariates, such 
as measures of disability and health status.
We use these data to compare times spent on the Food Stamp Pro-
gram for households with different circumstances, including different 
levels and histories of earnings. Our analyses further distinguish be-
tween households that appear to be eligible and those that appear to be 
ineligible for food stamps based on longer-run income data. We estimate 
longitudinal fi xed-effect regression models of the times that households 
spend on food stamps; these models account for additional permanent, 
unmeasured characteristics of households that might be confl ated with 
their earnings histories and program outcomes. Our multivariate results 
indicate that short-term earnings changes and earnings variability are 
each negatively associated with program participation for households 
with low levels of permanent income. These sources of volatility appear 
to be less strongly associated with participation for households with 
higher levels of permanent income.
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF EARNINGS VOLATILITY
A gap in program research, which this and other chapters in this 
volume address, concerns the role of previous earnings and program 
experiences. While numerous studies have examined the associations 
between people’s short-term characteristics, such as their immediate 
monthly incomes, and their program behavior, only a few have consid-
ered the impacts of income histories, the variability of their incomes, or 
other longer-term characteristics, on participation (see, e.g., Farrell et 
al. 2003). There are reasons to believe that earnings histories and vari-
ability might be relevant in a number of ways.
First, as mentioned in the introductory section, increased earnings 
variability can lead to more frequent changes in eligibility. For house-
holds that are initially eligible, these changes would take the form of 
brief periods of ineligibility; for households that are initially ineligible, 
they would take the form of brief periods of eligibility. The changes in 
eligibility could in turn lead to changes in participation.
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A second, related consideration is that, other things being held con-
stant, higher rates of volatility will lead to shorter continuous spells 
of eligibility and potential participation. Because there are fi xed costs 
associated with entering or reentering the Food Stamp Program (such 
as completing the application; supplying earnings records, a birth cer-
tifi cate, a Social Security card, and other documentation; and attending 
an interview), the reduction in potential spell lengths could deter par-
ticipation in the fi rst place.
Third, the program itself may place higher compliance demands 
on households with variable earnings. As Ribar and Edelhoch (2008) 
document in this volume, some states require more frequent recertifi ca-
tion intervals for households with earnings or with unstable incomes 
than for other households. Within our sample, one state, Texas, requires 
households to immediately report any change in work status—change 
in job, change in pay rate, or loss of job—while the other two states, 
Illinois and Massachusetts, only require households to report changes 
in monthly earnings of $100 or more. Higher compliance costs would 
again reduce the incentives for households to enter the program or to 
continue participating.
Fourth, while increased earnings volatility likely affects eligibility 
and compliance costs, it may also increase the value of food stamp par-
ticipation to recipients. As a means-tested program, the Food Stamp 
Program provides a form of social insurance, issuing more generous 
benefi ts when incomes are low and less generous benefi ts when incomes 
are high. Thus, the Food Stamp Program helps to smooth consumption 
for families who lack assets or opportunities to borrow. Households with 
variable earnings would benefi t more from this consumption-smoothing 
feature than would households with stable earnings, possibly contribut-
ing to a positive association between volatility and participation.
Fifth, we need to remember that households’ observed earnings may 
not be entirely exogenous but may instead refl ect behavioral elements, 
which may themselves be infl uenced by program behavior. Consider a 
household that receives an earnings shock in the form of a higher hourly 
wage rate, perhaps from an unexpected raise or a minimum wage in-
crease. If the household’s work hours remain fi xed, this wage increase 
would translate into an earnings increase. However, if the household 
places a premium on its nonmarket time or just on maintaining its 
food stamp eligibility, it might cut back its work hours, leading to little 
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change in earnings. In this case, we would observe that stable earnings 
were associated with continued participation, but earnings would not 
be the causal factor. In our analyses, we address possible confounding 
infl uences between earnings and program participation by estimating 
longitudinal fi xed-effect regression models that account for permanent 
unobserved characteristics of households. Additionally, our analyses 
will examine the association between current and past earnings out-
comes, on the one hand, and future program outcomes, on the other, to 
remove any concurrent reverse effects of participation on earnings.
DATA SOURCES AND MEASURES
The data for our analyses consist of interview data from the Three-
City Study linked to administrative case records for food stamp and 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) receipt. The Three-
City Study is a longitudinal survey of 2,458 children and their caregiv-
ers who were initially living in low-income neighborhoods in Boston, 
Chicago, and San Antonio. At the time of the fi rst interview in 1999, 
the families all had incomes below 200 percent of the poverty line. 
Although the survey includes many public assistance recipients, it was 
not specifi cally restricted to this group. Also, by design it includes both 
poor and near-poor families.
After the initial interviews, follow-up interviews were conducted in 
2000–2001 and 2005. Retention rates were high, as 88 percent of the 
original sample participated in the second round and 80 percent partici-
pated in the third round. In each wave, interviews were conducted with 
both the focal child and the child’s caregiver.1 In cases where the child 
and caregiver had separated, both were subsequently followed and in-
terviewed. For this paper, we rely on the information provided by the 
current and former caregivers, as they were in the best position to de-
scribe the households’ economic circumstances, demographic composi-
tion, and other characteristics.
In the most recent (third) wave of the survey, the caregivers who 
participated in face-to-face interviews were asked to give permission 
for the research team to gather administrative information about them.2 
Caregivers who agreed to this provided names and Social Security 
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numbers, which were then used to search for food stamp and TANF 
records. Of the 1,980 caregivers who completed in-person interviews, 
1,448 gave permission to be included in the administrative part of the 
study, and of this smaller number 1,286 were successfully matched to 
case fi les in Illinois, Massachusetts, or Texas.3
The administrative records from the state agencies cover the period 
from January 1997 to June 2006 and indicate the specifi c months in 
which the caregiver was a member of an assistance unit that received 
food stamps, TANF, or both. We use these data to form counts of the 
months that the caregiver received food stamp assistance in the quarter
and half-year following each of the three interviews. These are the pri-
mary outcome measures for our analyses.
Besides the food stamp outcome measures, we also use the admin-
istrative data to construct measures of the number of months out of the 
previous 12 that a caregiver received food stamp assistance or TANF. 
We use the measures of prior receipt as conditioning variables in our 
analyses.
The interview data from the Three-City Study provide us with most 
of our other explanatory variables. We are especially interested in the 
earnings of the caregivers. To measure current earnings, we use a con-
structed variable (supplied with the public-use version of the survey) 
of the caregiver’s labor earnings in her primary job during the month 
leading up to the interview; the measure includes her wages and salary 
along with possible commissions and tips.
The survey also includes retrospective questions regarding the care-
giver’s primary jobs for up to two years prior to each interview. From 
these questions, we form several summary measures of the caregiver’s 
earnings over the preceding 12-month interval, including an indica-
tor for whether there were any earnings during the period, the average 
monthly level of earnings, the maximum amount of earnings reported in 
any of the months, and the coeffi cient of variation for earnings. Because 
a nontrivial portion of the histories is incomplete (about 8 percent), we 
also include a dummy variable for whether summary measures could be 
formed. All of the earnings variables are adjusted for infl ation using the 
Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners (CPI-U) and expressed 
in 2005 values. We interpret the 12-month average of earnings as be-
ing an indicator of the long-term or persistent level of earnings, and we 
interpret the maximum monthly amount over this period as being an 
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indicator of earnings capacity. The coeffi cient of variation is used as a 
measure of earnings variability. In a regression that conditions on the 
earnings history, the current earnings variable can be interpreted as an 
indicator for short-term changes in earnings.
While the retrospective earnings data are useful, there are some 
weaknesses in the measures. First, they only describe the earnings of 
the caregiver and omit other household members. Second, the data are 
limited to primary jobs and do not cover all sources of earnings. Finally, 
the measures are limited to usual earnings for a given job and only 
change when there is a switch in jobs or employment status; the mea-
sures do not vary within a job spell.
A unique element of our analyses is that they distinguish between 
households that appear to be eligible for food stamps based on their 
long-term incomes and households that appear to be either ineligible 
or marginally eligible. There are three primary tests for food stamp 
eligibility: 1) a household’s income must be below 130 percent of the 
poverty threshold (the gross income test), 2) a household’s income after 
adjusting for program deductions and exemptions must be below 100 
percent of the poverty threshold (the net income test), and 3) a house-
hold’s assets must be below a certain value (the asset test). Because we 
lack detailed information on likely deductions and exemptions and on 
the level of assets, we focus on the gross income test. In each wave of 
the Three-City Study, caregivers were asked about all of the sources of 
income from all household members in the previous month. The pub-
lic-use version of the survey contains a measure of the income-to-needs 
ratio that incorporates the available information on total incomes and 
household composition. We fi t household-specifi c trend lines through 
the 1999, 2000–2001, and 2005 income-to-needs measures and use the 
values along these trend lines as our indicators of long-term income-
to-needs. Households whose trend values in a given wave are below 
1.3 are classifi ed as gross-income-eligible on the basis of their long-
term circumstances, while households whose trend values are above 
1.3 are classifi ed as gross-income-ineligible. About 75 percent of the 
wave-specifi c observations in our analysis sample are classifi ed as be-
ing eligible under this defi nition, and 90 percent of the caregivers are 
categorized as eligible in at least one wave.
The Three-City Study also asked caregivers about other economic 
circumstances of their households. We use responses to several differ-
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ent questions to measure access to capital and possible fi nancial diffi -
culties. One direct measure of access to capital is a binary indicator for 
whether anyone in the caregiver’s household had a bank account, sav-
ings account, or other investment account. Another direct measure is an 
indicator of whether the household had any outstanding loans, includ-
ing loans from family and friends. Our analyses also include separate 
indicators for whether the household owned a car or a home. Car and 
home ownership would not only reveal some previous fi nancial where-
withal but would also represent collateral against which the household 
might borrow. Finally, we include an index of recent fi nancial strains, 
supplied with the public-use fi le, that is constructed from fi ve ques-
tions on topics such as how frequently the household needed to borrow 
money to pay bills and whether it usually ended up with any money at 
the end of the month.
The interview data from the survey also provide us with demo-
graphic information about the caregiver and her household, including 
the caregiver’s age, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, health sta-
tus, and the numbers of children and adults in the household. These 
variables are routinely included in studies of benefi t receipt. In all of our 
multivariate analyses, we also include controls for the year and month 
in which the interview took place to account for unmeasured changes in 
policies and economic conditions.
We limit our analysis to caregivers who participated in all three 
waves of the survey and who could be linked to administrative records. 
After omitting observations with item nonresponse and dropping a 
small number of separated caregivers who no longer had any children 
in their households, we are left with an analysis sample of 931 caregiv-
ers and 2,793 wave-specifi c observations. Geographically, the observa-
tions are split nearly equally across the three cities. Means and standard 
deviations for the analysis variables, calculated separately for each city, 
are reported in Table 3.1.
The analysis sample is clearly made up of those who are disad-
vantaged, having not only been initially selected on the basis of low 
incomes but also subsequently restricted to households appearing in 
the assistance program records for the three states. The statistics are 
consistent with this selection. On average, the households spent more 
than half of each quarter or half-year following their interviews on food 
stamps. Average infl ation-adjusted monthly earnings just before the 
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interviews were $648 in Boston, $556 in Chicago, and $502 in San 
Antonio. Average earnings for the prior year were somewhat lower in 
Boston and San Antonio but somewhat higher in Chicago. More than 
half of the caregivers reported no earnings at all in the preceding year. 
Just over a third of the households had some kind of fi nancial account, 
with the average incidence varying substantially across cities. Roughly 
half of the households reported outstanding loans. While this latter sta-
tistic might appear to be favorable, it likely refl ects a lack of access 
to credit for many of the families. Only about one out of eight of the 
households owned the homes they lived in, and just over half of the 
caregivers were without a car. Few of the caregivers were married, and 
less than two-thirds had completed or gone beyond high school. Most 
of the caregivers were black or Hispanic (98 percent in San Antonio). 
About one-sixth reported disabilities severe enough to interfere with 
work. Lastly, the average number of children was high, at just under 
three per household.
Descriptive Analysis
Food stamp and TANF receipt in the two cities were strongly asso-
ciated with several economic characteristics of the caregivers. Table 3.2 
shows the average months of each type of program receipt in the year 
following the interview, calculated separately for some of these char-
acteristics. From top to bottom, the table is divided into three sections: 
the fi rst section reports estimates for the general sample of households, 
the second section reports estimates for households with trend incomes 
below the gross-eligibility threshold, and the third section reports es-
timates for households with trend incomes above the gross-eligibility 
cutoff. From left to right, results are listed separately for Boston, Chi-
cago, and San Antonio. 
Near the top of the table, the estimates show the anticipated result 
that the months of subsequent food stamp participation generally fall 
with the level of current earnings. Among the caregivers from Boston, 
the gradient was especially steep, as the participation rates for caregiv-
ers without earnings was more than four times higher than the participa-
tion rates for caregivers with $1,000 in monthly earnings. Moffi tt and 
Winder (2003) and Frogner, Moffi tt, and Ribar (2007) similarly found 
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Boston Chicago San Antonio
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Months on food stamps in next 3 1.57 (1.47) 1.64 (1.45) 1.92 (1.38)
Months on food stamps in next 6 3.13 (2.85) 3.24 (2.82) 3.81 (2.64)
Earnings in interview month ($) 648.47 (878.46) 555.83 (747.09) 502.03 (677.20)
Any earnings in last year (0/1) 0.56 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.59 (0.49)
Average earnings in last year ($) 614.39 (792.75) 579.44 (718.72) 494.35 (643.47)
Coeffi cient of variation for earnings in last year 0.39 (0.78) 0.42 (0.77) 0.46 (0.81)
Maximum earnings in last year ($) 840.99 (936.03) 793.53 (849.55) 693.20 (761.58)
Prior year’s earnings information missing (0/1) 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.25) 0.09 (0.28)
Household income-to-needs 1.09 (0.70) 1.02 (0.63) 0.91 (0.57)
Bank, savings, or fi nancial account (0/1) 0.52 (0.50) 0.29 (0.46) 0.35 (0.48)
Outstanding loans (0/1) 0.47 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50)
Owns home (0/1) 0.04 (0.19) 0.15 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39)
Owns vehicle (0/1) 0.38 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48) 0.57 (0.50)
Financial strain index 0.05 (0.73) 0.03 (0.73) −0.01 (0.72)
Months on food stamps in last year 6.61 (5.43) 6.69 (5.31) 8.09 (4.87)
Months on TANF in last year 4.49 (5.35) 3.78 (5.16) 2.78 (4.42)
Non-Hispanic black (0/1) 0.32 (0.47) 0.55 (0.50) 0.39 (0.49)
Hispanic (0/1) 0.50 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) 0.59 (0.49)
Age 35.07 (9.11) 33.76 (9.68) 31.80 (8.99)
Completed high school or GED (0/1) 0.47 (0.50) 0.33 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48)
Completed college (0/1) 0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.42)
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Disability that prevents work (0/1) 0.23 (0.42) 0.16 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38)
Number of minors in household 2.50 (1.26) 2.88 (1.42) 2.72 (1.37)
Married, spouse present (0/1) 0.08 (0.28) 0.16 (0.37) 0.18 (0.38)
Number of adults in household 1.56 (0.80) 1.85 (0.96) 1.71 (0.82)
Number of caregivers 308 300 323
Number of observations 924 900 969
NOTE: Amounts in rows labeled as “(0/1)” represent binary variables.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, using interview data from the Three-City Study matched to administrative records.
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Boston Chicago San Antonio
Average months on 
food stamps in next…
Average months on 
food stamps in next…
Average months on 
food stamps in next…
Characteristic N 3 months 6 months N 3 months 6 months N 3 months 6 months
All caregiver observations 924 1.6 3.1 900 1.6 3.2 969 1.9 3.8
Earnings in interview montha
None 456 2.1 4.2 441 1.8 3.5 450 2.3 4.6
$1,000 or less 140 1.7 3.5 172 1.8 3.7 225 2.0 3.8
More than $1,000 245 0.5 1.0 225 1.1 2.2 210 1.0 1.9
Average earnings in last yeara
None 321 2.2 4.3 293 1.7 3.3 311 2.5 4.9
$1,000 or less 269 1.9 3.8 314 2.0 4.0 374 2.0 4.0
More than $1,000 251 0.5 1.0 231 1.0 2.0 200 0.8 1.7
Coeffi cient of variation of earnings 
in last yeara,b
Less than 0.5 325 0.9 1.8 332 1.3 2.6 318 1.3 2.6
0.5 or higher 195 1.8 3.5 213 1.9 3.9 256 1.9 3.9
Observations with trend income 
below gross eligibility threshold
671 1.8 3.7 702 1.9 3.7 795 2.2 4.3
Earnings in interview montha
None 392 2.2 4.3 378 1.9 3.7 419 2.4 4.7
$1,000 or less 119 1.8 3.6 151 2.0 3.9 198 2.1 4.1
More than $1,000 104 0.6 1.3 120 1.5 3.0 103 1.5 2.8
Average earnings in last yeara
None 274 2.2 4.5 262 1.7 3.4 291 2.5 5.0
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$1,000 or less 227 2.0 4.0 261 2.2 4.3 319 2.1 4.2
More than $1,000 114 0.6 1.2 126 1.4 2.7 110 1.3 2.6
Coeffi cient of variation of earnings 
in last yeara,b
Less than 0.5 187 1.1 2.3 210 1.7 3.4 209 1.8 3.5
0.5 or higher 154 2.0 3.9 177 2.1 4.2 220 2.1 4.1
Observations with trend income 
above gross eligibility threshold
253 0.9 1.7 198 0.9 1.7 174 0.8 1.6
Earnings in interview montha
None 64 1.8 3.4 63 1.2 2.3 31 1.6 3.4
$1,000 or less 21 1.3 2.6 21 1.1 2.2 27 0.8 1.3
More than $1,000 141 0.4 0.8 105 0.6 1.2 107 0.5 1.0
Average earnings in last yeara
None 47 1.8 3.4 31 1.2 2.4 20 1.5 3.2
$1,000 or less 42 1.4 2.7 53 1.1 2.2 55 1.3 2.5
More than $1,000 137 0.4 0.8 105 0.6 1.2 90 0.3 0.6
Coeffi cient of variation of earnings 
in last yeara,b
Less than 0.5 138 0.5 1.0 122 0.7 1.3 109 0.4 0.9
0.5 or higher 41 1.1 2.0 36 1.1 2.3 36 1.3 2.6
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, using interview data from the Three-City Study matched to administrative records. 
a Excludes observations with missing earnings information.
b Excludes observations with zero earnings.
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that earnings and program receipt were negatively related when they 
examined self-reports of program participation in these data.
When we move to the next three rows of results, we see that aver-
age earnings over the preceding year are also negatively associated with 
food stamp participation. Although it is not entirely clear from the table, 
the association is slightly stronger for 12-month average earnings than 
for the current month’s earnings. This result is consistent, since the 12-
month fi gure is a longer-term measure.
The next two rows report 1) participation levels for households with 
positive earnings whose coeffi cient of variation was positive but below 
one-half and 2) participation levels for households with more variable 
earnings. In all three cities, more variable incomes were associated with 
higher levels of participation.
Households with trend incomes below the food stamp gross eli-
gibility threshold have participation rates that are more than twice as 
high as households with larger trend incomes. Though the participation 
rates for the high-trend-income households are much smaller in rela-
tive terms, they are still appreciable. Differences in actual versus trend 
incomes account for much of the residual participation; differences in 
the timing of the income and participation reports also account for some 
of the residual.
Multivariate Analyses
The simple conditional means reported in Table 3.2 show gross as-
sociations and do not account for confounding infl uences from other 
variables. For example, the bivariate cross-program associations be-
tween caregivers’ earnings variability and their subsequent food stamp 
participation may be an artifact of mutual correlations between these 
measures and the level of earnings. Alternatively, the association may 
refl ect correlations with some other variable. To address these possible 
sources of mutual correlation, we estimate longitudinal fi xed-effect re-
gression models of the characteristics associated with the caregivers’ 
food stamp receipt. The estimates from these models represent partial 
associations that hold the other observed characteristics constant.
Coeffi cient estimates and standard errors for the models of program 
receipt are reported in Table 3.3. The fi rst two columns of Table 3.3 
list results from models of food stamp participation in the quarter and 
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the half-year following the caregivers’ interviews. In these models we 
constrain the effects of the earnings history variables so that they are 
the same for households with trend incomes above and below the gross 
eligibility threshold. The next two columns list results from models that 
allow the coeffi cients for the earnings history variables to differ de-
pending on trend income. Explanatory variables are listed in the rows 
of the table. In addition to the variables found in the table, each of the 
models also includes an intercept and controls for age, education, miss-
ing earnings effects, and piecewise-linear trends, or linear splines, for 
the year and month of the interview. Each of the models in Table 3.3 
pools data across the three cities.
As with the bivariate analyses, the regression results from the fi rst 
two columns indicate that earnings in the month prior to the interview 
are negatively related to subsequent food stamp participation. The sizes 
of these associations, however, are modest. A $1,000 increase in current 
earnings, holding all else constant, is estimated to reduce food stamp 
participation in the subsequent three months by just over a week. Recall 
that the fi xed-effects regression controls for permanent characteristics 
of the households, such as their permanent incomes. So, the coeffi cient 
on current earnings must be interpreted as a change in this variable, 
holding permanent income and the other observed characteristics con-
stant. In other words, the coeffi cient represents the association between 
food stamp receipt and a temporary (and permanent-income compen-
sated) change in earnings.
In contrast to the bivariate estimates, the results from the fi rst two 
models indicate that more variable earnings are negatively, albeit mod-
estly, associated with subsequent food stamp participation. Again, these 
are estimates that hold permanent characteristics constant, including 
permanent incomes and permanent income variability. Thus, temporary 
positive earnings shocks and increased medium-term earnings variabil-
ity both appear to modestly reduce food stamp receipt.
The estimates from the fi rst two columns indicate that the associa-
tion between prior and subsequent food stamp receipt is statistically and 
substantively large. For example, being on food stamps for the entire 
year before the interview increases the expected participation in the fol-
lowing quarter by 2.1 months and increases the expected participation 
in the follow half-year by 3.6 months.
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Models with uniform effects of 
earnings history—months receiving 
food stamps out of next…
Models with variable effects of 
earnings history—months receiving 
food stamps out of next…
3 months 6 months 3 months 6 months
Earnings ($000) in interview month −0.282** −0.516** −0.361** −0.675**
   (0.048) (0.092) (0.060) (0.115)
Any earnings in last year 0.100 0.133 0.217** 0.388*
(0.091) (0.175) (0.106) (0.204)
Average earnings ($000) in last year −0.019 −0.116 −0.025 −0.276
(0.102) (0.196) (0.136) (0.261)
Coeffi cient of variation for earnings in last year −0.098** −0.194** −0.115** −0.263**
(0.044) (0.084) (0.051) (0.097)
Maximum earnings ($000) last year 0.051 0.132 −0.003 0.141
   (0.085) (0.163) (0.106) (0.204)
Trend HH inc. > gross elig. × earnings in interview montha 0.119 0.258
(0.092) (0.176)
Trend HH inc. > gross elig. × any earnings in last year −0.274 −0.671*
(0.179) (0.343)
Trend HH inc. > gross elig. × average earnings in last year −0.035 0.305
(0.208) (0.399)
Trend HH inc. > gross elig. × c.v. earnings in last year 0.009 0.147
(0.111) (0.213)
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Trend HH inc. > gross elig. × maximum earnings last year 0.166 0.025
(0.181) (0.348)
Trend HH income-to-needs 0.035 −0.032 0.006 −0.071
(0.079) (0.152) (0.084) (0.162)
Household income-to-needs 0.043 0.088 0.047 0.093
(0.063) (0.122) (0.063) (0.122)
Months on food stamps in last year 0.172** 0.299** 0.172** 0.300**
   (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Months on TANF in last year 0.004 0.013 0.003 0.011
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Bank, savings, or fi nancial account −0.057 −0.116 −0.062 −0.129
   (0.053) (0.103) (0.053) (0.103)
Outstanding loans 0.034 0.054 0.035 0.054
(0.050) (0.097) (0.050) (0.097)
Own home 0.010 −0.004 0.008 −0.011
(0.084) (0.162) (0.085) (0.163)
Own vehicle 0.008 0.096 0.014 0.110
(0.056) (0.107) (0.056) (0.108)
Financial strain index 0.031 0.108 0.031 0.107
(0.036) (0.070) (0.036) (0.070)
Disability that limits work 0.098 0.119 0.092 0.104
(0.080) (0.154) (0.080) (0.154)
(continued)
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Models with uniform effects of 
earnings history—months receiving 
food stamps out of next…
Models with variable effects of 
earnings history—months receiving 
food stamps out of next…
3 months 6 months 3 months 6 months
Number of minors in household 0.025 0.018 0.027 0.023
   (0.025) (0.048) (0.025) (0.048)
Married, spouse present 0.040 −0.023 0.049 −0.006
(0.080) (0.155) (0.081) (0.155)
Number of adults in household −0.065** −0.104* −0.063** −0.102*
(0.029) (0.056) (0.029) (0.056)
R2 0.60 0.66 0.61 0.66
NOTE: Longitudinal fi xed-effect regression models estimated using interview data from the Three-City Study matched to administrative 
records. Models also include intercepts, controls for age, education, missing earnings histories, and calendar time. Standard errors appear 
in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
a Trend household income being above the gross eligibility threshold is interacted (×) with the current monthly earnings variable.
SOURCE: Authors’ estimations.
Table 3.3  (continued)
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Increases in the number of adults are estimated to be negatively 
associated with food stamp receipt. None of the other estimated coef-
fi cients in the fi rst two columns is statistically signifi cant.
The next two columns in Table 3.3 report results from fi xed-effect
models that include interactions of the indicator for having a trend 
income above 130 percent of the poverty threshold and each of the 
earnings history measures. Except for these interactions, all of the 
other explanatory variables are identical to those in the previous two 
specifi cations.
The added interactions are jointly marginally signifi cant (the 
p-values for joint signifi cance for the three- and six-month outcome 
models are 0.17 and 0.12, respectively).4 Including the interactions does 
alter several of the uninteracted coeffi cients. In particular, the coeffi cient 
on the uninteracted current earnings variable becomes approximately 
one-third larger in magnitude compared to the previous specifi cations. 
The absolute value of the uninteracted earnings variability measure be-
comes 10 percent larger in the three-month model and one-third larger 
in the six-month model. Also, the uninteracted coeffi cient on having 
any earnings during the past year becomes signifi cantly positive. The 
changes indicate that the program behavior of households with trend 
incomes below the gross income threshold is more sensitive to changes 
in earnings histories than that of higher-income households.
We reestimated each of the interacted models separately for each 
of the three cities. Recall from the discussion of conceptual issues that 
some states have policies that effectively increase the compliance costs 
for households with volatile incomes. By estimating separate models 
we can see whether our results come from a particular state or a par-
ticular policy environment. Results from the state-specifi c fi xed-effects 
models are listed in Table 3.4.
From the table, we see that current earnings are consistently nega-
tively related to food stamp participation among low-income house-
holds. In the three-month models, the point estimates indicate that a 
$1,000 increase in earnings is associated with one to two fewer weeks 
of food stamp participation. In the six-month models, the effect size is 
on the order of two to three fewer weeks. The modest associations in 
each of the states are again consistent with the coeffi cients capturing 
temporary changes in earnings.
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Boston Chicago San Antonio
Months receiving food 
stamps out of next…
Months receiving food 
stamps out of next…
Months receiving food 
stamps out of next…
3 months 6 months 3 months 6 months 3 months 6 months
Earnings ($000) in interview month −0.440** −0.765** −0.298** −0.561** −0.260** −0.500**
   (0.096) (0.189) (0.108) (0.207) (0.110) (0.204)
Any earnings in last year 0.226 0.601 0.336* 0.575 0.111 0.080
(0.205) (0.403) (0.190) (0.363) (0.172) (0.321)
Average earnings ($000) in last year 0.185 0.294 −0.351 −0.851* 0.083 −0.268
(0.232) (0.455) (0.232) (0.443) (0.256) (0.478)
Coeffi cient of variation for earnings 
in last year
−0.151 −0.360** −0.155* −0.314* −0.036 −0.088
(0.092) (0.181) (0.089) (0.170) (0.085) (0.159)
Maximum earnings ($000) last year 0.023 −0.118 0.127 0.449 −0.197 −0.053
   (0.189) (0.371) (0.188) (0.359) (0.181) (0.338)
Trend HH inc. > gross elig. ×
   earnings in interview montha
0.074 0.120 0.042 0.086 0.253 0.555
(0.141) (0.276) (0.167) (0.320) (0.191) (0.357)
Trend HH inc. > gross elig. ×
   any earnings in last year
−0.213 −0.789 −0.226 −0.243 −0.650** −1.372**
(0.332) (0.653) (0.308) (0.587) (0.315) (0.587)
Trend HH inc. > gross elig. ×
   average earnings in last year
−0.146 −0.017 0.322 0.740 −0.157 0.295
(0.341) (0.671) (0.369) (0.704) (0.394) (0.735)
Trend HH inc. > gross elig. ×
   c.v. earnings in last year
0.089 0.409 −0.096 −0.218 0.124 0.341
(0.188) (0.370) (0.208) (0.397) (0.188) (0.350)
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Trend HH inc. > gross elig. ×
   maximum earnings last year
0.251 0.466 −0.051 −0.352 0.279 0.002
(0.293) (0.576) (0.333) (0.636) (0.335) (0.625)
Trend HH income-to-needs −0.119 −0.272 0.163 0.257 −0.033 −0.286
(0.133) (0.260) (0.159) (0.304) (0.156) (0.290)
Household income-to-needs 0.037 0.049 0.069 0.143 0.093 0.216
(0.105) (0.206) (0.111) (0.212) (0.116) (0.217)
Months on food stamps in last year 0.167** 0.280** 0.182** 0.327** 0.169** 0.293**
   (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019)
Months on TANF in last year 0.004 0.020 −0.013 −0.021 −0.0001 −0.004
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.020)
Bank, savings, or fi nancial account 0.005 0.189 −0.333** −0.639** 0.071 −0.013
   (0.088) (0.172) (0.116) (0.221) (0.084) (0.157)
Outstanding loans −0.130 −0.219 0.083 0.074 0.116 0.189
(0.091) (0.179) (0.090) (0.171) (0.085) (0.159)
Own home −0.120 −0.134 0.037 0.024 0.045 0.017
(0.229) (0.450) (0.141) (0.268) (0.122) (0.228)
Own vehicle 0.143 0.293 −0.061 0.078 −0.089 −0.128
(0.093) (0.183) (0.110) (0.209) (0.095) (0.177)
Financial strain index 0.095 0.233* 0.058 0.125 −0.013 0.043
(0.065) (0.128) (0.072) (0.137) (0.057) (0.107)
Disability that limits work −0.023 −0.247 0.020 0.044 0.254** 0.444*
(0.141) (0.276) (0.158) (0.301) (0.126) (0.236)
Number of minors in household −0.119** −0.319** 0.057 0.118 0.090** 0.158**
   (0.048) (0.094) (0.044) (0.084) (0.041) (0.076)
(continued)
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Boston Chicago San Antonio
Months receiving Food 
Stamps out of next…
Months receiving Food 
Stamps out of next…
Months receiving Food 
Stamps out of next…
3 months 6 months 3 months 6 months 3 months 6 months
Married, spouse present −0.019 −0.026 0.041 −0.005 0.115 0.046
(0.156) (0.306) (0.144) (0.275) (0.130) (0.242)
Number of adults in household −0.124** −0.202* −0.036 −0.086 −0.035 −0.034
(0.053) (0.105) (0.047) (0.090) (0.052) (0.096)
R2 0.15 0.11 0.51 0.61 0.11 0.20
NOTE: Longitudinal fi xed-effect regression models estimated using interview data from the Three-City Study matched to administrative 
records. Models also include intercepts, controls for age, education, missing earnings histories, and calendar time. Standard errors appear 
in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level. (two-tailed test).
a Trend household income being above the gross eligibility threshold is interacted (×) with the current monthly earnings variable.
SOURCE: Authors’ estimations.
Table 3.4  (continued)
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Earnings variability among low-income households is also consis-
tently negatively associated with food stamp participation; however, 
only three of the six coeffi cients are statistically signifi cant. The sig-
nifi cant negative associations between earnings variability and partici-
pation appear for Massachusetts and Illinois, but not for Texas. One 
difference in policies that could lead to greater sensitivity to income 
changes in the former two states is that they both have program waivers 
that allow them to change benefi ts within certifi cation periods based on 
changes reported to other programs such as Medicaid; Texas does not 
coordinate in the same way. Texas, however, has more stringent income 
reporting requirements for its Food Stamp Program than do the other 
two states (Rosenbaum 2000), so we might have expected stronger as-
sociations there.
Among low-income households, food stamp participation is higher if 
the caregiver had any earnings at all during the preceding year, although 
only one of these associations is statistically signifi cant. The positive 
associations could refl ect the different treatment of work income in the 
benefi t and eligibility formulas; specifi cally, low levels of earnings are 
not counted against the benefi t formula, while earnings above the ex-
emption amount are “taxed” at a lower rate than other income.
Among the other coeffi cients, prior food stamp receipt is consistent-
ly positively associated with subsequent food stamp receipt. Increases 
in fi nancial assets are negatively associated with food stamp receipt in 
Illinois but not in the other two states. Disability is positively associ-
ated with food stamp receipt in Texas. Adding an adult or a child to the 
household is signifi cantly negatively associated with food stamp receipt 
in Massachusetts; adding a child to a household is positively associated 
with food stamp receipt in Texas.
CONCLUSION
This chapter examines the relationship between earnings histories 
and program participation in a sample that matches administrative data 
on program outcomes with longitudinal survey information from the 
Three-City Study about earnings and other household characteristics. 
We conduct multivariate analyses, employing fi xed-effect regression 
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models that account for time-invariant characteristics of households, 
such as their permanent incomes. A unique aspect of our analyses is that 
we separately consider households with long-term trend incomes that 
make them more or less likely to be eligible for food stamps.
The chapter fi nds strong evidence that higher levels of current 
monthly earnings reduce program participation. This result is expected, 
as increased earnings reduce the need for assistance and also affect the 
eligibility and benefi ts associated with food stamps. What may be more 
surprising is that the magnitudes of the estimated associations are all 
relatively modest. The small sizes of the associations are likely due to 
our use of longitudinal fi xed-effect controls and numerous other eco-
nomic controls. With these controls, the identifying variation in current 
earnings comes from temporary changes.
We also fi nd evidence that medium-term earnings variability, mea-
sured by the coeffi cient of variation for the preceding year’s earnings, is 
negatively associated with food stamp participation, at least among low-
income households. There are several potential explanations for these 
results. For households that are initially below the eligibility threshold, 
variable earnings could lead to occasional periods of ineligibility and 
shorter eligibility spells. Program compliance costs may also increase 
with earnings variability. Other possible explanations for the negative 
association are that participation affects earnings, reducing variability, 
or that some other characteristic affects both earnings and variability. 
While we cannot rule out these other explanations, our empirical meth-
odology, which controls for permanent unobserved characteristics and 
which relates past earnings variability to subsequent program participa-
tion, makes them less likely.
Additionally, the estimation results provide modest evidence that 
program behavior in households with low long-term incomes is more 
sensitive to changes in their earnings and earnings variability than be-
havior in households with higher long-term incomes. When interactions 
of the earnings-history variables and the long-term income indicator are 
included in our models, the estimated coeffi cients for the earnings and 
earnings-variability measures for the low-income segment of our sam-
ple each increase. The changes in the coeffi cients are consistent with 
earnings volatility reducing eligibility among low-income households 
but not among higher-income households. 
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Notes
This chapter originally appeared as a paper for the National Poverty Center and Eco-
nomic Research Service conference “Income Volatility and Implications for Food As-
sistance Programs II,” November 16–17, 2006, in Washington, D.C. The authors grate-
fully acknowledge fi nancial assistance from the National Institute of Child Health and 
Human Development under grant numbers R01 HD36093 and R01 HD050370 and 
from the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture under co-
operative agreement number 43-3AEM-4-80116. They thank Paula Fomby and Bianca 
Frogner for their help preparing the survey data; Robert Goerge, Daniel Shroeder, and 
Jesse Valente for their help preparing the administrative data; and Rich Depolt and 
Irene Navarrete for valuable research assistance. They also thank Dean Jolliffe, Doug 
Besharov, and Jim Ziliak for helpful comments. The views expressed in this chapter are 
those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the supporting agencies.
 1. A single child in each family was followed through all three interviews.
 2. Of the 2,056 current and former caregivers who participated in the third wave, 
1,980 were interviewed in person and were asked for their permission to obtain 
administrative records.
 3. Robert Goerge from the Chapin Hall Center at the University of Chicago sup-
plied the records for Illinois, Daniel Shroeder from the Ray Marshall Center at 
the University of Texas supplied the records for Texas, and Jesse Valente from the 
Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance provided the records for that 
state.
 4. Evidence of differences in behavior is considerably stronger in alternative 
specifi cations that omit the maximum earnings variable and in random effect 
specifi cations.
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